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During the initial quarter-century of the post-World War II era, the development
strategies urged on less-developed countries by the economic think tanks and foreign aid
agencies of the capitalist world were shaped by Keynesian macroeconomics and by two
“lessons” from history that further enlarged the economic role assigned the state in the
development process. During the second post-war quarter century, the mainstream
perspective shifted to neo-liberalism, which reoriented macroeconomic policy to accord
with monetarism, structural policies with competitive general equilibrium theorizing, and
reinforced the reorientation with “lessons” from history that diminished the role of the
state in the development process. Recently, however, we have been witnessing growing
defections from neo-liberalism at the ideational level and tectonic shifts away at the
political level. Optimistically, these trends will return capitalistic development strategies
and their theoretical rationale, in spirit though not in detail, back to those of the initial
post-war quarter century; pessimistically, not before passing again through a 1930s-type
dark tunnel.
I. The Evolution from Dirigiste to Neo-liberal Development Strategies
What Keynesian theory brought to dirigiste development strategizing was the
inference that aggregate output and employment paths of market economies sans
government guidance are inherently unstable. That inference was further supported by
the global financial chaos of the interwar decades, which graphically demonstrated that
private financial markets are inherently too unstable to be allowed full freedom of
°
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action.1 Interest, exchange, and capital controls and subsidies—“financial repression”-were therefore acceptable tools for stabilizing fragile developing economies and
facilitating the funding of priority development projects as they struggled to catch up
with the developed world.
Internationally, this “lesson” plus Keynesian theory also shaped the Bretton
Woods Articles of Agreement, which established the World Bank to supply long-term
project loans to both war-ravaged and to less-developed countries, and the International
Monetary Fund to help implement and protect the pegged exchange rate system called for
in the Articles. These required all currencies to be convertible for current account
transactions, but sanctified controls of capital account transactions. The U.S. dollar was
to be pegged to gold, and the other currencies to be pegged to the dollar. The IMF was to
supply short-term credits to help countries defend currency convertibility, and to keep the
convertible exchange rate system compatible with domestic full employment by
coordinating the macroeconomic policies of deficit and surplus countries. In practice,
World Bank and IMF credits were dominated by governmental foreign aid flows that
were guided mainly by U.S. Cold War objectives. But both institutions rose in
importance in the succeeding neo-liberal era, although with new functions that deviated
from the Articles of Agreement. The Articles are still its de jure charter, but the IMF
now “honors them more in the breach than in the observance.”
The second “lesson,” drawn from 19th century economic history, was that
industrialization is the primary engine of economic development, but revving it up
required more extensive state action of later industrializing countries than of early
1

To quote from Ragnar Nurkse’s canonical study of the period:
“If there is anything that inter-war experience has clearly demonstrated, it is that paper currency
exchanges cannot be left to fluctuate from day to day under the influence of market supply and
demand….If currencies are left free to fluctuate, speculation in the widest sense is likely to play havoc with
exchange rates—speculation not only in foreign exchanges but also as a result, in commodities entering
into foreign trade.” [Nurkse, 1944, pp.137-38].
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industrializers to build up supportive infrastructure and to offset barriers to investment
and its appropriate allocation. “Industrial policy” and “picking winners” were
permissible components of strategies for industrializing the less-developed countries of
the post-WW II era.
The neo-liberal approach, on the other hand, takes off from the conviction that
general competitive equilibrium theorizing firmly establishes that competitive market
forces can bring real world capitalist economies to optimal output and employment
growth paths that maximize the welfare potential of the stocks of productive forces
employed. The chief cause of the unstable output and employment levels observable in
the real world are “exogenous shocks”--unpredictable events that require changing
production plans, relative prices and quantities, and that may transitorily disrupt the
system of interacting markets. Such disruptive events are primarily “technology shocks,”
i.e., the introduction of novel products and processes, and “policy surprises,” i.e.,
unanticipated government interventions in the operations of the private economy. But
governments can also retard longer term growth through tariffs, taxes and controls that
more permanently distort private incentives and relative prices. Differences in the
reliance on such market distorting policy instruments account in large part for the
differences in growth rates between countries.
Development strategy should, therefore, focus on maximizing market efficiency
by minimizing policy-induced distortions and surprises. Shrinking the scope of the
activist state would still leave it with essential functions. Thus inflation and deflation,
which distort market perceptions and incentives, require “market friendly” collective
action, i.e., “sound” fiscal and monetary policies to stabilize the price level. “Soundness”
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meant balancing the fiscal accounts and stabilizing the growth of the money stock.2 The
state would also retain an essential role in enforcing contracts, protecting life and
property, advancing education, and providing other basic public goods. But overcoming
the technological and capital accumulation shortfalls that had concerned the
interventionist development strategies of the Bretton Woods era should be left to the
market, by removing capital controls and other impediments to the free flow of foreign
direct and portfolio capital.
Supporting “lessons” from history? Chief among these was that the pre-World
War I gold standard demonstrated the viability as well as the virtues of free capital
mobility. Free of capital controls, long-term capital had flowed massively from
industrialized Europe to the United States and other “regions of recent settlement” with
independent currencies, while stabilizing short term financial flows substituted for gold
flows in keeping the exchange rates of the creditor countries within their “gold points.”3
Other “lessons” have been reversible. The path of neo-liberalism through the developing
countries soon became strewn with temporary successes that ended abruptly in systemic
currency and banking crises. Heralded initially by Washington, the IMF and Wall Street
as exemplars “pour encourager les autres,” the stricken exemplars after their fall were
transformed into examples of misapplications of the neo-liberal strategy to be avoided in
the future.

2

When the key components of Friedman-type Monetarism—the demand for money function and the
money multiplier--proved unstable, the emphasis shifted to targeting the price level, with the central bank
manipulating the short-term interest rate as its main targeting instrument.
3

This is obviously a narrow assessment of a complicated era in which pro-cyclical unemployment, wage
depression and emigration were also basic adjustment mechanisms in both the creditor and debtor
countries, along with tariff increases in most of the industrialized countries; domestic financial crises were
frequent phenomena; and many of the capital recipients, notably in Latin America, were unable to stay on
the gold standard for long. [Eichengreen 1996, Thomas 1954, 1972, Bloomfield 1959, Felix 2002].
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Neither of the alternative approaches to development was, therefore, implemented
uniformly and both produced mixed results. But the events that led to the shift to neoliberalism differed qualitatively from the current crisis of neo-liberalism that threatens a
return to dirigiste development strategies akin to those of the Bretton Woods era. The
earlier dirigiste approach gave way primarily because of political and ideological
pressures; the neo-liberal approach is giving way, counter political and ideological
pressures notwithstanding, because of its flawed economics.
Dirigiste development was gradually undercut by the backwash from the crisis
that terminated the Bretton Woods exchange rate system in the early 1970s. That crisis
was fundamentally political. There were economically feasible modifications of the
Bretton Woods system that could have extended its workability, but they required
collective agreements that proved politically unattainable.4 However, there was no
concurrent economic crisis of dirigiste development. Indeed, the 1960s decade climaxed
a record high quarter-century of growth of both GDP and GDP per capita in all
developing as well industrialized regions of the world [Maddison 2002, Table 3-1a]. The
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Thus, the “Triffin Dilemma,” a key factor in the 1960s crisis, could have been avoided had the U.S. not
rejected Keynes’ Clearing Union proposal for handling global liquidity problems and opted instead for the
IMF with its more-limited and inflexible dollar-dominated credits as the global supplier of emergency
liquidity. Belgian economist Robert Triffin had pointed out that this arrangement, combined with a dollar
freely exchangeable for gold at a fixed price in intergovernmental transactions, rendered the Bretton Woods
system dynamically unstable. That is, the growth of world trade would require an increase in global
reserves to finance trade and current account imbalances. With the monetary gold stock more or less fixed,
that increase would require the U.S. to run chronic balance of payments deficits. But as it did so, its rising
stock of foreign liabilities would soon overtake its gold stock, which would undermine the credibility of its
commitment to exchange gold for dollars on demand at the agreed price of $35 per ounce and threaten a
self-feeding run on the U.S. gold stock. Since the resources of the IMF were too meager to fill the liquidity
gap, the U.S., to keep its commitment would have to pursue deflationary policies sufficient to halt the
dollar drain. But that would also shrink global liquidity and threaten a return to inter-war deflation and its
dire economic repercussions. Alternatively, Bretton Woods members could transform the IMF into a
mechanism closer to Keynes’ Clearing Union.
A 1960s proposal to allow the IMF to supplement member country reserves with Special Drawing
Rights (SDRs) was intended to do that. Applied expansively, it would have loosened the chains tying the
dollar to gold, making it easier for the U.S. to devalue, and surplus countries to revalue, their exchange
rates. But that might also have weakened the international power that being the sole supplier of global
reserves brought the U.S. So it fought off the proposal for most of the 1960s before grudgingly agreeing to
a token allocation of SDRs at the end of the decade. The mechanism has remained marginalized since.
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uniquely fast growth was also unusually stable and equitable, leading Angus Maddison
and others to dub the quarter-century “the Golden Age of Capitalism.”5
The transition to neo-liberalism was mainly impelled by political and ideological
changes external to the developing world. In the 1970s “foreign aid fatigue,” especially in
the United States with its weakened balance of payments and war-induced inflation, plus
the recycling of surplus OPEC country deposits into bank loans to upper-tier developing
countries, initiated a major privatizing of “North to South” financial flows. The OPEC
price surge also slowed economic growth and accelerated inflation in the industrialized
countries. The stagflation helped monetarism and the new classical macroeconomics
dethrone Keynesianism as the ruling orthodoxy among Anglo-American economists. So
also did the “magic” of the financial markets, as they rapidly exploited arbitraging
opportunities, creating liquid markets for new financial instruments to hedge against the
unexpected volatility of the newly floating exchange rates. The efficient market and
rational expectations hypotheses (EMH and Ratex) became centerpieces of the emerging
neo-liberal orthodoxy, while also providing theoretical backing to the demands for
decontrol from the financial sectors of the major industrial countries.
Paradoxically, it was the first major financial failure of neo-liberalism, the early
1980s debt crisis, that was most instrumental in forcing the new orthodoxy on the
developing countries, for it brought in the IMF to oversee the rescue. Sidelined during
the recycling boom, the IMF was now assigned the task by the major creditor countries of
coordinating a rescue effort that would keep the mainly Latin American debt crisis from
exploding into a global banking crisis. The fear was that some of the major international
lending banks, having become badly overleveraged in their avidity to lend, were
vulnerable to massive withdrawals of inter-bank deposits, should one or more
5

The interval 1950-73 was also the only sustained period during which the interregional spread of GDP per
capita narrowed rather than widened. [Maddison 2001, Table 3-1b].
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overborrowed Latin American country default. Withdrawals plus the fall in the market
value of the defaulted loans could force the overleveraged banks into insolvency as well
as illiquidity, with dire repercussions on other banks and their business customers around
the world.
In coordinating the rescue, the IMF therefore tied the bailout credits to priorities
that deviated from those assigned it by its charter, the Bretton Woods Articles of
Agreement. Protecting private international creditors took top priority over stabilizing
the debtor economies and minimizing employment and output losses.6 Large IMF, World
Bank and IBRD loans to enable debtor governments to keep up debt servicing were made
conditional on the creditor banks agreeing to renew maturing loans, and on debtors
agreeing to raise interest rates, but not capital controls, to deter the ongoing capital flight,
and to move toward primary fiscal surpluses sufficient to service the foreign bank debts.
The latter had to include loans to private domestic banks and corporations that had been
contracted without government guarantee. The last condition, an ex post socializing of
private debts, augmented the requisite primary fiscal surpluses, as did also repaying the
bailout credits. The rescue packages sustained debt servicing long enough to enable the
overleveraged banks by the end of the decade to regain solvency and the confidence of
the international financial centers.7 But the cost to the Latin American debtors was the
“Lost Decade,” their first extended economic depression of the post-war.
To rationalize the asymmetrical burden-sharing, the IMF and World Bank
embarked on an extensive campaign to spread the neo-liberal message. Their reports

6

During the Bretton Woods era currency and debt crises were more easily localized. Since most of the
international lending was intergovernmental, the Paris Club, a consortium of creditor countries, would take
charge of negotiating relief packages with the debtor governments The IMF, to the extent it became
involved, typically conditioned its credits on commitments by the debtor governments to reduce domestic
and external macroeconomic imbalances by policies that reduced reliance on quantity controls.
7
Near the end of the decade the creditor banks felt strong enough to refuse to participate in new bailout
packages. The U.S. Treasury then intervened with the Brady Plan, which imposed a mild “haircut” on the
banks and collateralized their remaining loans outstanding with U.S. bonds.
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blamed the debt crisis on various policy errors and omissions of the debtor governments
that had misled the creditor banks to overlend; hailed the potential benefits to developing
countries of opening up to foreign capital inflows; and urged the adoption of marketliberalizing reforms to “get prices right,” and “sound” macroeconomic policies to regain
the confidence of foreign lenders and investors. Protecting the private foreign creditors,
blaming crises on government failure, and conditioning its credits on “sound”
macroeconomic policies and more market liberalizing reforms became the IMF’s
standard approach to future currency and financial crises of developing countries. Thus
as the frequency of such crises rose, the IMF reacted to rescue failures by expanding its
market-liberalizing and privatization demands in order to hasten the removal of the
policies and structural inadequacies that it decided were still blocking the way to the Holy
Grail, the transformation of developing countries into smooth functioning, fast growing
and globally integrated free market economies. Prior to 1975, the average number of
conditions to which the IMF had tied its credits was less than four; during 1985-95 it rose
to twelve [Gould 2003; Figure 1].
The IMF view of its role in sustaining financial globalization also soared. During
the tequila crisis, Michel Camdessus, then Managing Director of the IMF, pronounced
that “In today’s globalized markets, we must ensure that our ability to react approaches
the instant decision making of investors if we want to have the ability to give confidence
to markets and our members.”[IMF Survey, June 19, 1995].8 Concurrently, the IMF and
the U.S. proposed amending the Articles of Agreement by replacing embarrassing Article
8

Camdessus indicated what this entailed in a February 1995 interview on the McNeil-Lehrer News Hour.
The chief objective of the $50 billion credit package given Mexico was not to prevent default, he asserted,
but to keep Mexico from using capital controls to halt the run on its dollar reserves by foreign and
domestic holders cashing in their peso-denominated, exchange rate-indexed tesebonos for dollars.
Contractually, Mexico was merely obligated to remunerate holders of these treasury notes in exchange-rate
adjusted quantities of pesos. It could therefore have curbed much of the dollar drain by closing the Banco
de Mexico’s dollar window to the peso recipients. But, as Camdessus pointed out, were Mexico successful
in solving its currency crisis this way, it would set a bad example to other developing countries in similar
financial distress, which might reverse the progress toward globalizing free capital mobility.

9
VI, which validated the use of capital controls by member states and authorized the IMF
to suspend credits to members when used to finance capital flight, with a new article that
made eliminating capital controls a condition of membership in good standing. The
proposal was to be submitted to the September 1997 meeting of IMF members. But with
the Asian crisis then in full contagion, the proposal was quietly shelved.
But while the push to spread neo-liberalism as a development strategy has been
fundamentally political, its current crisis is rooted in economic failures. Chief among
these is the accumulating evidence that the capstone of the neo-liberal strategy,
liberalizing and globalizing capital markets, has not accelerated economic growth in the
developing countries by more efficiently guiding their capital accumulation and
technological progress. On the contrary, it has been associated with slower and more
unstable growth. Moreover, the failure is likely to persist, because the neo-liberal case
for capital market liberalization has also an extremely weak basis in economic theory,
and growing awareness of this is undermining confidence in its policies at the IMF and
other promoters of capital market liberalization. How soon such policies themselves
come to be modified to allow developing countries more macro-policy autonomy will be
determined more by power and ideology than by economic analysis. But the failure of
the capstone of the neo-liberal strategy to deliver economically, should lead through
domestic political reactions to a weakening of the heavy hand of the international capital
markets over the macroeconomic policies of developing countries, which should make
other dimensions of dirigiste development feasible again. Sections II, III and IV expand
on the evidence and the theoretical critique, while concluding section V discusses policy
implications for developing countries.
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II. The Pace of Development: Bretton Woods vs. the Neo-Liberal Decades.
Tables 1 and 2 document that, contrary to neo-liberal expectations, capital market
decontrol and the resulting increase of market-driven international financial flows has
been associated with a slow-down rather than a faster increase of national output. Table
1, which groups countries by region, shows that the falloff of GDP growth after the
Bretton Woods quarter century affected all but one of the groups. Among the
industrialized groups, the decline ranged from -26% for the “Western Offshoots”
(Maddison’s term for the U.S. and the British Dominions) to -69% for Japan. Among
developing countries, growth rates declined for all but the Asian group, with Africa
falling-38% and Latin America -43% below their Bretton Woods era rates during 197398. The “World” decline of -39% includes the Soviet cum ex-Soviet countries. They
dropped, according to Maddison’s data, from an annual growth rate of 4.84% during
1950-73, to -0.56% during 1973-98. The negativity was because of the collapse of output
during their great leaps forward to capitalism in the 1990s; earlier their declining growth
was still positive.

Table 1
Annual GDP Growth Rates, 1950-98
Regional Groups
1950-73
1973-98
(a)
(b)

%Change:
(b)/(a)

Western Europe
Western Offshootsa

4.81
4.03

2.11
2.98

-56.8
-26.1

Japan
Asia (excluding Japan)
Latin America
Africa
Worldb

9.29
5.18
5.33
4.45
4.91

2.97
5.46
3.02
2.74
3.01

-69
5.4
-43.3
-38.4
-38.7

a

The U.S. and British Dominions.
Includes the Soviet and ex-Soviet
Countries.
b

Source: Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, Table 3-1a.
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Table 2 tests whether the Table 1 comparisons hide countering trends and
individual exceptions. The data covers all non-Communist countries whose 1983 GDP
exceeded US$10 billion in 1983 prices, and sorts out major oil exporters from the
industrial and developing countries’ sub-sets. The Table divides the post-Bretton Woods
era into three decades and compares the GDP growth rate per decade of each country
with its growth rate in 1960-71. The latter period marked the institutional peak of the
Bretton Woods exchange rate system. The West European countries had terminated the
European Payments Union, and beginning in 1959 their currencies were fully convertible
for all current account transactions.9 Table 2 shows that the first post-Bretton Woods
decade had the largest number of exceptions; 13 of the 53 countries had annual GDP
growth rates that equaled or exceeded 1960-71. But subtracting the oil exporters removes
6 fast-growing developing countries, leaving only 7 of the remaining 44 developed and
developing countries with 1972-81 growth rates that matched or exceeded their 1960-71
rates. The numbers shrink with each successive decade. In 1992-2001 only 5 of the 53
countries matched or exceeded 1960-71: three developing countries--none oil exporters—
and two industrial countries. As regards growth, the Bretton Woods era ended on a high
note; while the neoliberal era has been heading toward low B flat.

9

We chose 1960 to begin our Bretton Woods yardstick in order to enlarge the developing country sub-set,
for many of whom methodologically standardized GDP time series are available only from 1960 on.
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Table 2
Comparative GDP Growth per Decade: 1960 - 2001

1972 - 1981
1982 - 1991
1992 - 2001'

Percent with Decadal Growth below their 1960 - 1971 Average
Total Sample
Excluding Oil
Industrialized
Developing
(n=53)
Exporters*
Countries**
Countries***
75.5
84.1
90.9
64.5
88.7
88.6
100.0
80.6
90.6
88.6
95.5
87.1

Sources:World Bank, World Development Indicators, various issues
IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues
OECD Economic Outlook # 73
* Oil Exporters: Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, United Kingdom, Venezuela
** Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States
*** Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Arab Rep.,
Hong Kong, China, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Syrian, Thailand, Turkey,
Venezuela

Table 3 shows, unsurprisingly, that the annual growth of gross fixed investment
also declined sharply after 1971. More surprising, Table 3 shows that despite the
intensified emphasis on trade liberalization in the neo-liberal era, the annual growth of
merchandise exports has also declined. Maddison, using the regional groupings of Table
1 above, finds that the export growth rate in 1973-98 was substantially lower than in
1950-73, both world wide, and in all his regions except Latin America [Maddison 2001,
Table 3-2a]. The rising ratio of exports to GDP in Table 3 merely reflects that the GDP
growth of the industrialized countries declined more than their export growth.
Maddison’s data show that this was also the case world-wide and in all the developing
regions except Africa, where export growth fell more than GDP growth in 1973-98
[Maddison 2001, Tables 3-1a and 3-2b].
Table 4 shows that for the industrialized countries, the post-Bretton Woods
growth of labor productivity of their business sectors has also fallen off sharply.
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Comparable data are too sparse to extend the comparison to a representative sample of
developing countries. But Tables 5 to 9 below report financial trends from the postBretton Woods era that imply that the causality runs from the financial globalization of
the past two decades to the adverse real economy trends indicated by Tables 1 to 4.

Table 3
Growth of Real Investment and Exports, 1959 - 2002
G7

OECD
(Percent)

Annual Growth of Gross Fixed Investment
1959 - 1971
1972 - 1984
1985 - 1997
1998 - 2002'

6.1
2.5
3.6
2.6

6.0
2.3
3.9
2.5

Annual Export Growth'''
1959 - 1971
1972 - 1984
1985 - 1997
1998 - 2002'

7.8
6.2
6.6
2.8

8.5
6.3
6.7
3.8

Ratio of Export Growth to GDP Growth
1959 - 1971
1.7
1972 - 1984
2.1
1985 - 1997
2.5
1998 - 2002'
0.5
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook, various issues
IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues
' 2002 is an estimation
" World exports are deflated by IMF's unit export prices.
''' Data for G7 and OECD are GDP weighted averages.

1.8
2.3
2.5
1.4

World''

8.2
4.6
6.8
5.1
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Table 4
Labor Productivity Growth of the Business Sector of the OECD
Countries: 1960 - 2002
G7

Other OECD
(Percent)

Annual Averages
1960 - 1973
4.5
1973 - 1979
1.6
1979 - 1997
1.4
1998 - 2002'
1.5
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook, various years
' 2002 is a preliminary estimation
GDP weighted averages

All OECD

5.0
3.1
2.6
3.2

4.6
1.8
1.6
1.6

III. Causal links from Financial Liberalization to Slower Growth
A. Increased Volatility and Misalignments of Real Exchange Rates
Table 5 data contradict a basic tenet of neo-liberalism: that a regime of floating
exchange rates and free capital mobility would enable nominal exchange rate movements
to stabilize real exchange rates. Movements of the nominal rates should eliminate
temporary disequilibria in the pricing of goods in different currencies, with arbitraging
currency speculators speeding up the adjustment, and thus helping to keep international
traders and investors supplied with the correct set of real prices on which to base their
decisions. Large longer-term fluctuations of real exchange rates, on the other hand,
reflect misaligned real exchange rates, that are generally caused by policies that hinder
nominal exchange movements and capital mobility. In the past two decades nominal
exchange rate volatility indeed increased over the already volatile 1970s, and capital
decontrol spread around the globe, allowing daily global foreign exchange transactions to
shoot up from around $18 billion in 1977 to $1.5 trillion in 1998. But as Table 5 shows,
annual movements of the real exchange rates, already substantial in the 1970s, rose
moderately higher in most of the industrialized countries after 1980, and more
substantially in most of the developing countries.
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Underlying this global financial churning are problematic global trends, most
beginning in the mid-1970s to early 1980s. These are a sustained rise of real long-term
interest rates, a rising share of economic resources drawn into financial activities, an
income distribution trend in the industrialized countries favoring rentier income at the
expense of wage income, slower GDP growth, and a sustained upsurge in the rate of debt
accumulation--mostly household and business debt.
Table 5
Inter-Decade Comparison of the Annual Volatility of Real Exchange Rates: 1970 - 1980 = 100

Mean

(Trade Weighted Indices)
1970 - 80
1981 - 91
Range* Coef Var**
Mean
Range* Coef Var**

Mean

1992 -2002
Range* Coef Var**

Industrialized
Countries

100

0.2148

0.0703

104.51

0.2113

0.0720

107.45

0.1892

0.0639

U.S.

100

0.2320

0.0773

108.39

0.3045

0.1070

106.91

0.2195

0.0841

Japan

100

0.2220

0.0690

105.76

0.3107

0.0999

113.56

0.2729

0.0939

Euro Countries

100

0.2093

0.0738

94.59

0.2540

0.0929

96.37

0.2259

0.0735

Other OECD

100

0.2124

0.0691

105.11

0.1819

0.0615

108.13

0.1704

0.0565

Developing
Countries

100

0.4327

0.1470

98.18

0.5510

0.1988

87.60

0.3201

0.1020

Asian 10

100

0.3413

0.1173

91.22

0.3952

0.1493

76.04

0.2450

0.0826

Lat. Am. 8

100

0.3141

0.0991

93.82

0.6964

0.2411

96.66

0.3726

0.1175

100 0.7433
0.2604 115.58 0.6168
0.2248
Mideast/African 6
Source:Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, World Financial Markets, various issues

94.79

0.3754

0.1136

* Difference between the highest and lowest values in the period, divided by the mean.
** Standard deviation divided by the
mean.
Euro uses a synthetic Euro spot exchange rate, for pre-Euro years
Other OECD= Australia, Canada, Denamark, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K.
Asian 10 = Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand
Latin America 8 = Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela
Mideast/African 6 = Kuwait, Morocco, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey
Ind. Countries = US, Canada, Japan, Austria, New Zealand, Euro, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
UK.
Developing Countries = Latin America 8, Asian 10, and Mideast/African 6
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B. Higher Real Long Term Interest Rates
Table 6 contrasts the interest rate/growth rate relationship for the G-7, pre- and
post- the early 1980s, using the credit risk-free 10 year government bond rate of each G-7
to index its real long-term interest rates. Note that during the peak Bretton Woods
period, 1959-71, the real 10-year interest rate of each G-7 was comfortably positive,
averaging 2.6% for the group [Felix 1998, Table 7]. Yet it fell short of the GDP growth
rate of each country by a substantial margin. The margin shrank in 1972-84, but
remained negative in all except Germany during the inflationary OPEC-boom years,
since despite the decline of GDP growth in each of the seven, their real interest rates also
fell, averaging negative in three of the countries [Felix 1998; Tables 2 and 7]. The abrupt
shift to positive margins during 1985-2002, on the other hand, is due primarily to sharply
higher real interest rates, with further GDP growth retardation a minor contributor except
in Japan.
Table 6
Real Interest Rate on 10 Year Governments Minus the Real GDP Growth Rate*
United
United
Kingdom
States
Canada France Germany Italy
Japan**
1881 - 1913
1919 - 1939
1946 - 1958
1959 - 1971
1972 - 1984
1985 - 1997
1998 - 2002

-1.98
-1.65
3.74
2.61

-4.29
-1.87
3.56
3.03

-2.01
1.54
0.89
1.26

-3.40
-4.92
2.99
3.30

-8.56
-2.76
0.21
1.51

-0.38
-1.58
1.88
1.61

-1.96
-0.44
1.82
1.22

G-7***
0.97
2.40
0.36
-3.23
-1.67
2.15
2.08

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues
Pre-1959 data from Bordo (1993, Table 1)
* Nominal rates deflated by the GDP deflator after 1958 and by CPI pre1959.
** Data begin in 1965
*** Unweighted average.

Why the upsurge of real long-term interest rates? A common explanation is that
lenders, reacting belatedly to the higher inflation of the OPEC period, have been
incorporating a higher inflation premium in their offer prices. The trouble with this
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explanation is that G-7 inflation peaked in the early 1980s and has been declining since,
into deflationary territory in the case of Japan, yet real long-term rates have maintained
their positive margins over GDP growth rates.
The alternative explanation uses the fact that the upsurge of real long-term rates
coincides with the approximate date when capital decontrol had encompassed enough
major industrial countries to allow the formation and rapid expansion of an international
market in long and short-term debt instruments. This severely weakened the power of
central banks to influence long-term rates; they could still anchor the short end of the
yield curve, but the slope depended much more than before on market reactions to the
central bank’s move. Before, when the central bank lowered the short end, bond holders
could only express their inflation phobia by moving down the yield curve to shorter
maturities. But this was self-limiting, since it would soon depress those yields to
unappealingly low levels. Decontrol opened up another escape channel--to foreign debt
instruments with higher interest rates and favorable exchange rate prospects. Over the
next two decades international transactions in debt instruments rose explosively.
What provided the surging demand for loanable funds needed to keep up real
yields internationally by matching the explosive outflows? Not the growth of real
aggregate demand or real investment; both slowed globally (See Tables 1-3). And not
rising deficit financing; during 1983-2000 aggregate fiscal deficits of the OECD
countries declined as a percent of GDP [Economist August 23, 2003; p.56]. Rather, the
slower growing financing needs of real investment and fiscal deficits were offset by more
rapidly growing demand for consumption financing (housing, consumer durables, etc.),
funding of mergers and acquisitions, venture capital acquisitions, initial public offerings,
and other financial underpinnings of the global equity price bubble and expanding flows
during the 1990s to “emerging market” countries, both peaking at the end of the 1990s,.
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Thus, by weakening the ability of central banks to influence the slope of the yield
curve, capital decontrol has imposed two types of costs on the real economies of the
financially liberalized economies. During the prolonged equity price and lending
bubbles, high real long-term interest rates helped depress the growth of real investment.10
And the aftermath of the recent collapse has been a massive debt overhang which is
further depressing private investment and demand for labor, as over-indebted firms and
households struggle to make payments and rebuild their balance sheets, with lenders
reacting to their accumulating carteras vencidas by becoming more risk averse.11 But the
stimulating effect of lowering the short end of the yield curve is still being thwarted by
bond market reactions that tilt the slope. In Table 6, real long-term interest rates of all
the G-7 have continued to exceed their real GDP growth rates, despite the collapse of the
bubbles, outright deflation in Japan and further diminution of inflation in the other six
countries. Indeed, Table 6 suggests the current situation resembles not the pre-WWI
Gold Standard era with its secularly rising prices, but the depressed interwar era with its
secularly declining prices. Deflation helped make the large debt overhangs of the 1930s
unserviceable, a “lesson from history” that must haunt Chairman Greenspan of the U.S.
Fed, as he runs out of room to lower further his weak policy instrument, the short-run
rate.

10

The high real interest rates may have also contributed to the misallocation of investment by raising the
“hurdle rate” less for investing in higher risk-higher expected returns projects than for lower return-lower
risk projects. This may help account for the high concentration currently of structural excess capacity in
“New Economy” facilities and consumer durables plants.

11

The IMF’s recent Global Financial Stability Report is concerned that lenders of the major financial
centers have become too risk averse. Viz: “…as this report went to press, the main sources of risk to global
financial stability seemed to be associated with a further significant and excessive cutback in risk taking in
financial markets and in lending to less creditworthy borrowers, including in emerging markets, which
could have potential implications for the global economy.”[IMF December, 2002; p.7]
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C. Rising Resource Absorption in Financial Activities and Rising Rentier
Shares of National Income
From the 1950s through the 1990s the gross value added of Finance, Insurance
and Real Estate activities (FIRE) rose nearly monotonically as a share of GDP, in each of
the G-7 countries [Felix 1998; Figures 1-7]. The share of finance proper in the labor force
of the OECD countries averaged 21% higher, and its share of total OECD investment
104% higher in 1980-93 than in 1970-79 [Edey amd Hviding 1995; Table 2]. After 1975,
finance was also the fastest-growing component of international trade in services, rising
at 13% per annum, while investment in financial facilities was the largest component of
FDI in services during the 1980s [OECD 1994].
However, the relationship between FIRE and the non-financial components of
GDP appears to be non-linear. After the mid-1970s the rising trend of their FIRE shares
associate with declining real growth rates of non-financial activities in each of the G-7.12
The welfare implication of the non-linearity is striking. The welfare contributions of
non-financial activities are direct; they produce the goods and services which supply
consumption and productive capacity. The welfare contributions of FIRE activities are
indirect; they facilitate and govern the allocation and distribution of non-financial goods
and services currently and over time. The adverse relationship between the growth of
Fire and non-Fire activities after 1975 implies that the progressive liberation of FIRE
activities after the mid-1970s enabled them to draw resources from non-financial
activities to the detriment of economic welfare.
As for income shares, these took a great leap upward during the two “Bubble
Economy” decades. A recent study that extensively mined OECD national income and
12

I have not had time to extend these charts for this paper, but the sketchy financial and employment data
suggest that FIRE share probably peaked around 2000, and has been declining since, perhaps faster than the
declining growth of non-financial activities.
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financial data, extracted the following findings for 13 industrialized OECD countries
[Epstein and Powers 2003: Table 1]. In 10 of the 13 countries, the average rentier share
of national income in 1980-2000 was higher than for 1960-1980.13 The mean increase
for the ten countries was 77.9% and the median increase 80.5%. The study provides data
on the capital shares of the non-financial private sector of 11 of the 13 countries for the
same two periods. Their average share merely rose 9.5%, and the median share 17.2%,
with decreased shares in 4 of the 11 countries. Combined, however, the national capital
shares of 9 of the 11 countries averaged higher in 1980-2000 than in 1960-1980, which
means decreased labor shares of national income, a result consistent, the study points out,
with the findings of other labor income studies.
D. External Capital Flows and Net Resource Flows to Developing Countries,
1970-2002
Table 7 presents annual debt flow data, i.e., interest-bearing loans, to the
developing and the Soviet cum ex-Soviet countries from 1970 to 2002, while Table 8
adds non-debt inflows—foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio equity flows—and
puts the combined data in a balance of payments format. The debt data combine official
with private flows, with all data deflated to 2002 U.S. dollars to get a better handle on net
resource flows. To save space, the annual flows are presented only in 10 year intervals,
plus the latest available post-Bubble Economy year, 2002.
The combined data for all the Table 7 regions show two gross debt inflow cycles,
one peaking around 1980, the second around 2000 (actually, 1998) circling a flat trend.
Deduct repayments of principal, however, and the net inflows decline sharply after 1980
to around zero by 2000. Subtract rising interest payments on debt and the net resource
transfers become increasingly negative from 1990 on. The last is only partly offset by
13

Rentier income is defined in the study as the net profits of firms engaged primarily in financial market
activities plus net interest income received by the rest of the private economy. Capital gains were excluded
from the calculations of Table 1 because of inadequate data.
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equity inflows—FDI and portfolio equity inflows—which cycled upward after 1980 and
peaked around 2000 before declining. As Table 8 shows, net flows on capital account
have remained positive to date, but rising current account outflows--profit remittances
and interest payments--have overtaken net capital account inflows, so that net overall
resource transfers also became negative by the end of the 1990s.
The regional data present a more diverse picture. Latin America, East Asia and
the ex-Soviet bloc—have largely determined the overall trends, receiving around 81% of
the Gross Debt inflows and 91% of the net equity inflows, with Latin America numero
uno, receiving 38% of all debt inflows and 36% of all equity inflows.14 But the postBubble data show Latin America also to be the most vulnerable of the three major
recipients. Since 2000, it has been the focus of almost all the decline of gross debt and
FDI inflow to developing countries, and its outward resource transfer leads the three by a
wide margin. The “Lost Decade” rides again? The debt indicators in Table 9 suggest
this possibility. They show Latin America’s recent indicator values to be second only to
those of the Sub-Saharan Africa region, whose need for debt relief is now axiomatic.

14

Most of the regional results were determined by flows to a handful of countries. A recent IMF study
reports that flows to 22 developing countries accounted for almost all the private flows to developing
countries: 7 are Latin American, 8 are East Asian, 2 are South Asian, 4 are Middle East and North Africa,
and 1 is Sub-Saharan [Prasid et al. 2003; Appendix V].
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Table 7
Annual External Debt Flows: 1970 - 2002 (selected years)
(2002 US$ million1/)
1970
1980

1990

2000

2002

All Developing Countries.
1. Gross Debt Inflow*
2. Net Debt Inflow**
3. Interest Payments
4. Net Transfers on Debt***

49,384
24,431

269,513
186,303
-89,111
97,191

186,466
74,168
-86,409
-12,241

267,014
-1,059
-126,829
-127,979

247,844
7,193
-102,701
-95,508

6,032
3,678

31,376
23,093
-9,338
13,755

48,349
24,255
-16,180
8,075

31,108
-18,634
-26,144
-44,778

48,820
-8,282
-20,659
-28,941

4,120
1,893

40,164
26,224
-10,456
15,769

28,226
2,976
-15,536
-12,560

77,319
22,817
-24,232
-1,415

71,183
11,165
-23,877
-12,711

25,041
10,757

131,482
89,378
-47,733
41,644

55,317
26,149
-29,138
-2,988

128,140
-1,134
-56,703
-57,837

96,159
3,509
-41,797
-38,288

3,393
1,820

26,646
16,901
-12,417
4,484

20,899
999
-10,879
-9,880

8,371
-6,767
-8,944
-15,711

12,130
-302
-7,738
-8,040

6,009
3,016

14,168
11,187
-2,354
8,832

17,510
10,765
-7,882
2,883

13,676
3,540
-6,155
-2,614

9,727
860
-4,863
-4,003

4,794
3,271
0
0

25,675
19,520
-6,812
12,709

16,165
9,022
-6,794
2,228

8,400
-881
-4,651
-5,623

9,826
243
-3,768
-3,524

East Asia and Pacific
1. Gross Debt Inflow*
2. Net Debt Inflow**
3. Interest Payments
4. Net Transfers on Debt***

Former Soviet Countries
1. Gross Debt Inflow*
2. Net Debt Inflow**
3. Interest Payments
4. Net Transfers on Debt***

Latin America and the Caribbean
1. Gross Debt Inflow*
2. Net Debt Inflow**
3. Interest Payments
4. Net Transfers on Debt***

Middle East and North Africa
1. Gross Debt Inflow*
2. Net Debt Inflow**
3. Interest Payments
4. Net Transfers on Debt***

South Asia
1. Gross Debt Inflow*
2. Net Debt Inflow**
3. Interest Payments
4. Net Transfers on Debt***

Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Gross Debt Inflow*
2. Net Debt Inflow**
3. Interest Payments
4. Net Transfers on Debt***

Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance - CD-Rom 2003
US GDP deflator from IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues
1/

Deflated by US GDP Deflator,

* Long term plus short term private and official debt inflow
** Line 1 less repayment of principal
*** Line 2 - line 3
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The current debt indicator values of Table 9, in conjunction with the findings of a recent
IMF study of the debt overhang problem, also shed additional light on the impact of
financial globalization on the welfare of the developing countries and on current global
financial fragility. The IMF study [Patillo et al. 2002] working with 1969-98 external
debt and GDP data from 93 developing countries obtained non-linear average
relationships between external debt and GDP growth—Laffer-shaped curves—that are
quite similar to each other under different econometric techniques and conditioning
variables. The curves peak at debt/GDP and debt/export ratios well below any of the
current regional values in Table 9, implying that all the regions are now on the
descending half of the external debt/GDP growth curve. More ominous is thefinding that
the curves move into negative territory--meaning the debt level is depressing-the growth
rate--when the debt/GDP ratio exceeds 35 to 40%, and the debt/export ratio exceeds 160
to 170%. Table 9 shows that the ex-Soviet countries, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan
Africa—now exceed that critical debt/GDP ratio, with the last two regions also exceeding
the critical debt/export ratio.
The IMF study imposes a full capacity growth condition on the econometrics,
smoothing its annual data by 3-year and 10-year averaging. Its working hypothesis is
that over-indebtedness lowers economic growth by depressing the level of investment
and its quality, but not the level of capacity utilization. It thus avoids confronting the
adverse Keynesian effects on GDP growth brought on by the volatility of capital inflows,
and by the pro-cyclical fiscal-monetary policies forced on developing countries with
large foreign-debt overhang debts by the “disciplining” of the capital markets and IMF
bailouts.
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Table 8
Balance of Payment Impact of Capital Flows of Developing Regions, 1970 - 2002
(selected years)
(2002 US$ million1/)
1970

1980

1990

2000

2002

All Developing Countries.
Capital Account Inflows
Net Foreign Direct Investiment
Net Portfolio Equity Flows
Total Non-Debt flows
Net Debt Flows
Current Account Outflows
Net FDI profit remittance
Interest Payments on Debt
Net Resource Transfers

32,836

196,500

110,811

192,159

159,553

8,411

10,200

30,828

166,298

143,000

-8

-2

5,815

26,921

9,360

8,403

10,198

36,643

193,219

152,360

24,433

186,302

74,168

-1,059

7,193

-11,264

-126,664

-109,193

-204,150

-168,701

-2,537

-37,553

-22,784

-77,320

-66,000

-8,727

-89,111

-86,409

-126,829

-102,701

21,572

69,836

1,618

-11,990

-9,148

East Asia and Pacific
Capital Account Inflows
Net Foreign Direct Investiment
Net Portfolio Equity Flows
Total Non-Debt flows
Net Debt Flows
Current Account Outflows
Net FDI profit remittance
Interest Payments on Debt
Net Resource Transfers

4,443

25,630

39,559

46,892

54,128

767

2,546

13,226

45,595

57,000

-1

-8

2,078

19,931

5,410

765

2,538

15,304

65,526

62,410

3,678

23,092

24,255

-18,635

-8,282

-616

-12,586

-22,780

-58,653

-49,659

0

-3,249

-6,599

-32,509

-29,000

-616

-9,338

-16,180

-26,144

-20,659

3,826

13,043

16,779

-11,761

4,469

Former Soviet Countries
Capital Account Inflows
Net Foreign Direct Investiment
Net Portfolio Equity Flows
Total Non-Debt flows
Net Debt Flows
Current Account Outflows
Net FDI profit remittance
Interest Payments on Debt
Net Resource Transfers

2,115

26,281

4,884

54,287

41,565

221

56

1,569

30,223

29,000

0

0

338

1,248

1,400

221

56

1,907

31,470

30,400

1,894

26,225

2,977

22,816

11,165

-565

-10,516

-15,815

-30,833

-29,877

0

-60

-279

-6,601

-6,000

-565

-10,456

-15,536

-24,232

-23,877

1,550

15,765

-10,932

23,454

11,689
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Table 8 – (cont)
1970

1980

1990

2000

2002

Latin America and the Caribbean
Capital Account Inflows
Net Foreign Direct Investiment
Net Portfolio Equity Flows
Total Non-Debt flows
Net Debt Flows
Current Account Outflows
Net FDI profit remittance
Interest Payments on Debt
Net Resource Transfers

15,258

101,789

39,863

76,912

46,509

4,501

12,412

10,458

78,437

42,000

0

0

3,255

-392

1,000

4,501

12,412

13,714

78,045

43,000

10,757

89,377

26,150

-1,133

3,509

--7,852

-57,997

-38,796

79,709

-60,797

-2,537

-10,264

-9.658

23,005

-19,000

-5,315

-47,733

-29,138

56,703

-41,797

7,406

43,792

1,067

-2,797

-14,288

Middle East and North Africa
Capital Account Inflows
Net Foreign Direct Investiment
Net Portfolio Equity Flows
Total Non-Debt flows
Net Debt Flows

2,795

11,475

4,599

-3,962

2,728

979

-5,427

3,594

2,555

3,000

-2

0

6

250

30

977

-5,427

3,600

2,805

3,030

1,819

16,901

999

-6,767

-302

-387

Current Account Outflows
Net FDI profit remittance
Interest Payments on Debt

-30,840

-14,376

-15,602

-12,718

0

-18,422

-3,497

-6,658

-5,000

--387

-12,417

-10,879

-8,944

-7,738

Net Resource Transfers

2,408

-19,365

-9,777

-19,564

-10,010

11,592

8,452

6,660
5,000

South Asia
Capital Account Inflows
Net Foreign Direct Investiment
Net Portfolio Equity Flows
Total Non-Debt flows
Net Debt Flows
Current Account Outflows
Net FDI profit remittance
Interest Payments on Debt
Net Resource Transfers

3,277

11,563

260

377

693

3,198

1

0

135

1,713

800

261

377

828

4,911

5,800

3,016

11,186

10,765

3,541

860

-1,108

-2,420

8.,031

-7,400

-5,863

0

-66

-149

-1,246

-1,000

-1,108

-2,354

-7,882

6,155

-4,863

2,169

9,143

3,561

1,051

797

Sub-Saharan Africa
Capital Account Inflows
Net Foreign Direct Investiment
Net Portfolio Equity Flows
Total Non-Debt flows
Net Debt Flows
Current Account Outflows
Net FDI profit remittance
Interest Payments on Debt
Net Resource Transfers

4,949

19,762

10,314

9,580

7,963

1,684

235

1,289

6,290

7,000

-5

6

3

4,171

720

1,678

241

1,291

10,461

7,720

3,271

19,521

9,022

-881

243

-737

-12,304

-9,395

-11,953

-9,768

0

-5,492

-2,601

-7,302

-6,000

-737

-6,812

-6,794

-4,651

-3,768

4,213

7,458

918

-2,373

-1,804

Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance - CD-Rom 2003
1/

US GDP deflator from IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues
Deflated by US GDP Deflator,
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Table 9 shows that four of the regions—East Asia, the ex-Soviet countries, the Middle
East and North Africa, and South Asia—have been trying to avoid that plight by building
up their foreign exchange reserves at a fast pace. This has meant accumulating U.S.
treasury bills, which currently yield a meager 1% interest, as expensive and uncertain
insurance against currency attacks and U.S. protectionist threats. It is uncertain because
the widening U.S. current account deficits now require foreigners to purchase a halftrillion dollars per annum of dollar assets, else the U.S. would have to close the gap
through dollar depreciation, tightened U.S. monetary-fiscal policies and slower growth.
The reserve buildups of developing countries and Japan are now major bulwarks against
these depressing alternatives. The Chinese and Japanese buildups, which this year are
financing half the U.S. current account deficit, are also defenses against increasing U.S.
pressure on those countries to appreciate their exchange rates or face US. protectionism.
A number of dire global financial scenarios can be constructed from the conflicting
behavior.15

15

An interesting one is that were China to succumb to U.S. demands to lift capital controls and let its
exchange rate be market-determined, it would cause a flight to the dollar by depositors in China’s shaky
banks that would depreciate the yuan, while destabilizing China’s financial system and relative exchange
rates globally [Economist, September 6-12.2003; pp.13-14].
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Table 9
External Debt Indicators of Developing Regions
1970

1980

1990

(Percent)
2000

2002

11.6

20.6
84.6
13.0
6.7
23.3
23.8

35.2
170.8
18.7
8.1
16.3
11.7

39.7
119.4
19.3
6.2
14.2
30.1

39.1
112.8
16.2
4.9
14.5
40.0

16.2
190.0
26.7
14.2
22.6
23.3

35.5
135.2
17.8
7.2
16.1
26.0

31.8
77.2
11.4
3.9
12.9
55.6

28.7
71.2
10.9
2.9
18.4
77.2

80.6
422.3
70.2
30.1
22.6
1.9

17.6
306.3
44.8
17.1
18.2
5.6

54.2
121.9
18.4
5.7
16.0
24.0

48.6
110.1
18.0
5.1
13.9
34.6

35.8
201.6
36.3
19.3
26.7
15.0

44.6
254.5
24.4
12.2
16.3
9.9

40.9
168.4
38.6
11.8
13.5
19.9

48.2
173.6
29.6
9.2
12.7
20.4

22.0
40.9
5.6
3.1
25.3
68.6

45.7
118.9
15.6
5.5
24.1
15.8

30.5
88.1
10.1
3.8
23.0
39.5

30.5
86.9
8.7
3.3
23.6
52.3

16.2
164.3
12.0
5.3
6.5
22.6

32.4
324.7
28.7
15.5
9.6
2.7

27.9
154.1
14.7
5.5
3.6
26.2

25.4
138.6
11.4
4.0
3.4
48.5

23.5
65.4
7.2
3.8
18.3
23.5

63.1
208.6
12.8
6.3
11.6
7.4

68.8
175.2
11.2
3.7
15.7
16.4

65.0
164.5
10.7
3.0
13.5
17.8

All Developing Countries.
Total Debt over GNP
Total Debt over Exports
Debt Service over Exports
Interest paid over Exports
Short Term over Total Debt
Reserves over Total Debt

18.1

East Asia and Pacific
Total Debt over GNP
Total Debt over Exports
Debt Service over Exports
Interest paid over Exports
Short Term over Total Debt
Reserves over Total Debt

30.2

21.6

Former Soviet Countries
Total Debt over GNP
Total Debt over Exports
Debt Service over Exports
Interest paid over Exports
Short Term over Total Debt
Reserves over Total Debt

27.8

6.0

Latin America and the Caribbean
Total Debt over GNP
Total Debt over Exports
Debt Service over Exports
Interest paid over Exports
Short Term over Total Debt
Reserves over Total Debt

20.3

13.3

Middle East and North Africa
Total Debt over GNP
Total Debt over Exports
Debt Service over Exports
Interest paid over Exports
Short Term over Total Debt
Reserves over Total Debt

12.4

69.1

South Asia
Total Debt over GNP
Total Debt over Exports
Debt Service over Exports
Interest paid over Exports
Short Term over Total Debt
Reserves over Total Debt

15.1

8.5

Sub-Saharan Africa
Total Debt over GNP
Total Debt over Exports
Debt Service over Exports
Interest paid over Exports
Short Term over Total Debt
Reserves over Total Debt

11.4

32.3

Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance - CD-Rom 2003
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IV. The Current Theoretical and Policy Confusion at the IMF
The IMF’s rationale for its conditionality demands of developing country
supplicants has been that financial liberalization, privatization, and “sound” monetaryfiscal policies opens the road to faster development by attracting more private foreign
capital to supplement shortfalls in domestic savings, skills and technology. Underpinning
this rationale is the belief that financial markets are efficient processors of information
and allocators of capital, hence pour in to fill such shortfalls. When the funds showed a
disturbing propensity to also pour out, it was facile for a time to blame that on policy
surprises, lack of transparency and other information flaws of the recipient country that
had misled the financial markets, and to add conditionality demands to the programs to
reshape the economy and make it more appealing to the financial markets.16 Such
conditions have imposed heavier adjustment costs on the debtor country, but the
improved appeal to foreign investment was supposed to bring it greater offsetting benefits
over the longer run.
Confidence at the IMF in this general policy approach and its theoretical
underpinnings is now flagging. This shows up in critical reports by IMF economists, and
in the rhetoric of top level IMF bureaucrats about the need for countries to “own” their
adjustment programs, denials that the IMF takes a “one size fits all” approach to policy,
and similar jargon.
Thus IMF economists Ashoka Mody and Antu Murshid in a 2002 IMF Working
Paper [“Growing Up with Capital Flows,” IMF Working Paper WP/02/75] tested the

16

The increases were labeled “structural adjustments” as distinct from mere quantitative targets. “Whereas
in the mid-1980s structural conditionality in IMF programs was rare, by the mid-1990s most programs
included some structural conditions…the average number of structural conditions per program year
increased from two in 1987 to more than 16 in 1997 [Bulir and Moon 2003; p.5].
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relationship between capital inflows and domestic investment on 1977-98 data from 60
developing countries and report the following:
“Our results suggest that the flush of capital inflows in the 1990s was more of a
‘push’ into developing countries than a ‘pull’ based on a significant unmet demand for
investment financing. As a consequence, much of the new wave of inflows was diverted
into alternative uses, a part of which (specifically the accumulation of reserves) was a
direct consequence of the inflows. However, a striking aspect of the 1990s experience
was the large volume of capital outflows from the same countries that received
significant inflows. Thus the observed marginal relationship between capital inflows and
domestic investment fell, even as countries liberalized to attract new flows. The results
of this paper imply either that the shortage of capital was not the problem, as in many
countries of East Asia, or that the ability to absorb that capital was limited, particularly
when faced with a rush of volatile flows.”
The study does find a statistically significant positive effect of FDI on domestic
investment, but one that weakened in the 1990s as the percentage of FDI directed at
mergers and acquisitions rose from 6% in 1995 to 30% in 1998. The degree of financial
liberalization, however, had no statistically significant effect on either long-term FDI or
portfolio inflows.
Similarly, Ales Bulir and Soojin Moon, in “Do IMF-Supported Programs Help
Make Fiscal Adjustments more Durable?” [IMF Working Paper WP/03/38, February
2003] answer the titled question negatively. Their procedure is to compare the fiscal
balance effects of 33 IMF “program countries” where the programs included structural
adjustment conditions with those of 31 program countries without such conditions. The
programs of both groups of countries were operative during 1993-96. The fiscal balance
behavior during the same period of a third group of 48 “non-program countries” is used,
along with other conditioning variables, to isolate exogenous cyclical and trend effects on
the program outcomes. The tests compare the average fiscal balances and the proportions
due to revenue and expenditure changes three years after program termination for each
group of countries. The main findings (pp. 27-28):
“Although the overall fiscal balance improved in most countries, the impact of
IMF-supported programs was not statistically significant….The statistical insignificance
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of IMF-supported programs indicates that program participation does not make the fiscal
adjustment softer—on average program countries adjust as much as non-program
countries. In general, all fiscal variables were strongly influenced by the business cycle.”
“In programs with structural conditionality, revenue declined slightly and
expenditure declined significantly. In contrast, in programs without structural
conditionality, revenue remained stable and expenditure increased somewhat.”
“We find some evidence that programs with too many structural conditions have
worse results than those with fewer conditions (the ‘ownership’ nexus). Second we find
no quantitative evidence that structural conditionality aimed at raising revenue was
successful. Third, post-program expenditure compression clearly was much stronger in
countries with structural conditionality, but risk of reversal was higher too.”
The canonical IMF reassessment of the effect of financial globalization on the
developing countries is a recent monograph by four senior IMF economists, including the
IMF’s outgoing chief economist [Prasad et al. IMF March 17, 2003. 86 pp]. Its review of
the evidence?
1. “The main conclusions are that, so far, it has proven difficult to find robust
evidence in support of the proposition that financial integration helps developing
countries to improve growth and to reduce macroeconomic volatility.” (p.11)
2. “There is little evidence that financial integration has helped developing countries
to better stabilize fluctuations in consumption growth, notwithstanding the
theoretically large benefits that could accrue to developing countries in this
respect. In fact new evidence presented in this paper suggests that low to
moderate levels of financial integration may have made some countries subject to
even greater volatility of consumption relative to that of output. Thus while there
is no evidence that financial globalization has benefited growth, there is evidence
that some countries have experienced greater consumption volatility as a result.”
(p.6)
Its policy suggestions, however, are minor adjustments of the IMF’s basic policy
line. Greater integration with the financial markets of the North should remain the basic
orientation of developing country policy, though they will also need more “robust legal
and supervisory frameworks, low levels of corruption, high degree of transparency and
good corporate governance” to increase the benefits from, and control the risk of,
globalization.” (p.6) How to accomplish this?
“The review of the available evidence does not…provide a clear road map for
countries that have started or desire to start on the path to financial integration. For
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instance, there is unresolved tension between having good institutions in place before
capital market liberalization and the notion that such liberalization itself can help import
best practices and provide an impetus to improve domestic institutions. Furthermore,
neither theory nor empirical evidence has provided clear-cut general answers to related
issues such as the desirability and efficacy of selective capital controls.” (pp. 6-7)
Therefore,
“…there may be value for developing countries to experiment with different paces and
strategies for pursuing financial integration….It might not be essential for a country to
develop a full set of sound institutions matching the best practices in the world before
embarking on financial integration….An intermediate and more practical approach could
be to focus on making progress [toward]…transparency, control of corruption, rule of
law, and financial supervisory capacity.” (p. 58)
In sum, the policy reassessment is rather a damp squib. It advises the IMF to ease
up on its structural adjustment demands, but ignores a more pressing conundrum
afflicting IMF policy. The capital flows to developing countries, and the macro policies
that the IMF demands of debtor countries in order to sustain debt servicing, are both
strongly pro-cyclical. Do the higher interest rates and the fiscal austerity demanded by
the IMF induce a faster return of foreign capital, or do they deter the revival of foreign
capital inflows by deepening and prolonging the domestic depression? The heated
conviction that the latter is the case has become the main motivator of the rapid rise of
popular anti-IMF fervor in the developing countries. To extend a U.S. political cliché:
it’s the economy, stupid, not lack of policy ownership per se. But reverting the IMF from
its current function of protecting financial globalization to its original task under its
charter, the Articles of Agreement, of facilitating full employment growth of its
members, requires power shifts or ideological changes among the IMF’s political
overseers, the owners of its policy-making. That’s beyond the powers of the IMF
bureaucracy to effect, or even to discuss openly.

A. Theoretical Confusion at the IMF
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IMF theorizing about financial globalization and its current problems appears now
to be riding two horses in opposite policy directions. IMF policy advice to developing
countries still rests on the thesis that liberated financial markets can consistently price
capital assets correctly in line with future supply and demand trends of the economy (i.e.,
“the fundamentals”) and that the asset pricing, therefore, provides a reliable welfare
improving guide to private saving and investment decisions in decentralized market
economies. Call it the Efficient Market Hypothesis writ-large, or EMH+. The current
policy head-scratching concerns merely how fast to liberalize and to elevate the domestic
institutional environment to the level of “transparency, control of corruption, rule of law,
and financial supervisory capacity” characterizing “the best practices of the world,”
where presumably the EMH+ already rules. But a different perspective is seeping into
recent IMF Global Financial Development Reports, working papers that explore balance
sheet deterioration as a crisis precursor [e.g, Keller et al, 2002] and house efforts
(unsuccessful thus far) to devise workable early crisis warning models (briefly described
in Mulder, 2002). This perspective resembles Keynes on financial markets, which helped
shape the approval of capital controls in the Bretton Woods Articles of Agreement
(notably, Article VI) and which forms the core of the research program of the PostKeynesian school. It is that liberated financial markets are inherently prone to
endogenously generate destabilizing dynamics that will lead to crises with adverse
repercussions on aggregate output and employment, and need, therefore, to be held in
check with countervailing policies.
Why the infiltration of theoretical heresy? Presumably because IMF economists
are recognizing that the heresies are far better grounded in real world behavior of
economic agents under uncertainty than the fanciful micro-foundations anchoring the
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EMH+, and provide therefore more useful theoretical insights for analyzing the crises
that are plaguing financial globalization. A brief comparison may explain why.
The EMH+ takes off from the assumption that capital markets are in almost all
essentials like all other markets in the neoclassical paradigm. They are populated by
equally well-informed maximizing agents who exchange at market-clearing prices that
accurately reflect this information and the maximizing choices of each agent given her
available resources. To be sure capital markets involve the exchange of claims today on
the expected returns from assets that only start paying off tomorrow and the days after.
But while it is too much of a stretch to assume that today’s information about tomorrow
is complete, it is OK to assume that the capital market agents know today the stochastic
probability distributions of the future cash flows from capital assets and collectively price
the present value of these assets accordingly.
Armed with the EMH+, anti-Keynesian economists embarked in the 1960s on an
ambitious research program to refute Keynesian theorizing in all its varied forms.
Rational Expectations (dubbed Ratex for short) showed that market agents equipped with
accurate knowledge of future probabilities would render impotent counter-cyclical macro
policies to smooth saving and investment volatility. The Real Business Cycle school
embarked on demonstrating that the business cycle was not generated endogenously by
market dynamics, but by exogenous shocks, primarily from new technologies, that
temporarily destabilize the economy as they move productive forces in real time to higher
equilibrium output paths. As it became evident in the 1970s that exchange rates had
become quite volatile, and that cross currency trading in assets rather than in
commodities had become the dominant determinant of exchange rate movements, the
EMH+ was used to develop “news models” of exchange rate determination. These were
intended to show that the volatility merely reflected the speed with which traders in the
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liberated exchange markets are able to move the exchange rate to its new equilibrium
value each time new information about fundamentals required it.
Methodologically, however, the research program has, in Lakatosian terms, been
“degenerate.”17 It tries to protect its core belief in the optimality of real world markets
by illegitimately shrinking the explanatory scope of the “protective belt” of other
auxiliary propositions developed with the same intent. In making technical change
exogenous, the Real Business Cycle School simply discards as inconvenient rather than
disproved the earlier post-war literature on factor market-guided technical change that
inhabits the same protective belt surrounding the core paradigm. The “representative
agent” simplification, which has been the hallmark of asset market modeling grounded in
the EMH+, conveniently avoids the complications of asymmetric information, but can’t
explain why market agents holding identically optimal portfolios at each moment, would
have any motive for trading with each other—a serious defect of models intended to
explain asset trading dynamics. The analytic modeling has thus produced professional
in-jokes rather than insights, while the econometric versions have performed very poorly
as out-of-sample predictors..
Completing the critique is the falsity of the claim that the EMH+ is a logical
corollary of the mathematical proofs that competitive multi-market economies can
produce vectors of simultaneously market clearing prices and quantities. Except for the
Arrow-Debreu model, these proofs merely establish alternative sufficiency conditions for
the existence of local equilibriums. That is, markets reach equilibrium and bounce back
to it if subjected to limited disturbances, but beyond these limits equilibrium breaks
down. This is a structuralist, not a laissez-faire, conclusion, expressed in higher math.
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The reference is to Imre Lakatos’s modification of Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm-shift approach to scientific
epistemology. [Lakatos and Musgrave 1970].

35
Moreover, the proofs have nothing to say about equilibrium in financial markets, since
they do not assign a role to money as a store of value.
The Arrow-Debreu proof establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence of general competitive equilibrium that does address inter-temporal exchange,
but with conditions that are unattainable in a real world capitalist economy. The A-D
proof requires a complete set of futures markets to exist, or to form as needed, that allow
investors to insure their inter-temporal positions against all possible adverse
contingencies. That eliminates uncertainty, but also transforms the capitalist
entrepreneur, the bearer of uninsurable risk, into an accountant able to convert his risky
positions into sure bets. And since an appropriate timing of payments and receipts
eliminates the need to hold assets for their liquidity, wealth maximizing agents would not
hold money, a zero earning asset.18 Nor would fully insured entrepreneurs need to protect
their wealth by overseeing production. Hence as self-interested consumers valuing
leisure over work, they would head for the golf course instead of the office. In short,
realization of the complete futures markets condition is blocked by an insoluble moral
hazard barrier. The Arrow-Debreu model is thus a reductio ad absurdum disproof that a
laissez-faire economy can move along a stable growth path, and that investor uncertainty
can be contained in reliable probability distributions, as the EMH+ assumes [Cf. Arrow
and Hahn 1991; Chapter 14].
The inference of the A-D disproof is also that there is no sound theoretical basis
for the IMF’s contention that combining gradual liberalization with institutional reforms
that bring “transparency, control of corruption, rule of law and financial supervisory
capacity” to the levels characterizing the “best practices of the world,” will allow
developing countries to absorb foreign capital flows beneficially. It takes two to tango,
18

Yet “in a world with a past as well as a future and in which contracts are made in terms of money, no
equilibrium may exist.” [Arrow and Hahn 1991; p.361].
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and full liberalizing—capital decontrol and all—gives maximum scope to the financial
markets of each partner to misstep. Putting the onus on the developing countries to do all
the adjusting is biased policy when the financial markets of the developed economies are
responsible for much of the stumbling.
The alternative post-Keynesian perspective focuses primarily on financial
instability in capitalist economies with mature financial sectors. The micro-foundations
driving its dynamic analysis are twofold. Individual position-taking in a competitive
capitalist economy is clouded by radical uncertainty about future cash flows, and market
competition forces rational agents to include changing market “sentiment” as well as
changing “news” about fundamentals in their calculations. More specifically, in a
continually changing capitalist economy probability distributions of future cash flows
that convert uncertainty into reliable risk assessments do not exist. And fear of losing
market share deters firms and banks from sticking with cautious liability strategies, if
their competitors are gaining from more risky debt leveraging.
The late Hyman Minsky, a leading post-Keynesian, combined these
microfoundations with elements from Keynes, Kalecki, Marx, Schumpeter, and the preWW II Chicago School, to advance two general propositions in his increasingly
influential Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH). The first proposition, that the welldeveloped financial markets of modern capitalist economies are inherently crisis-prone,
may now be reaching receptive ears among IMF analysts. The second proposition, that
crisis minimizing requires preemptive monetary policy surprises, and “big government”
rather than rolling back the state, is still forbidden territory, given the ideological
predilection of the current owners of IMF policy; hence the wishy-washy reaffirmations
of that general policy line with which IMF analysts conclude their critical reports.
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The first proposition asserts that a state of financial tranquility—the ubiquity in
the economy of banks and firms with strong balance sheets and cautious liability
management—produces the seeds of its destruction by lowering assessments of credit
risk. Banks and related financial institutions begin exploiting more intensely the interest
arbitraging opportunities offered by the upward-sloping yield curve. They expand their
privileged access to low cost liquidity in order to lend more long-term, and resort to
financial innovations to evade regulatory constraints on their liability leveraging and
maturity mismatching. Concurrently, non-financial firms take advantage of the increased
availability of long term credit to increase debt financing of new and existing products
and production processes. Loan pushing interacting with debt leveraging generates a
surge of investment and output, encouraging the capital markets to hike up asset values.
These collateralize higher levels of debt and add an augmented risk of hostile takeover to
the fear of loss of market share to impel cautious firms to join the debt leveraging. The
ballooning of debt commitments renders the financial system increasingly vulnerable to
the risk that interruptions in the flow of funds between debtors and creditors will spiral
into a systemic payments crisis with adverse repercussions on output and employment.
Various endogenous shocks can set off the interrupted payments spiral: capacity
overbuilding in the production sector; credit crunches, i.e., abrupt hardening of
refinancing terms; the collapse of asset price bubbles, etc. The timing of the shock,
whether it hits the financial system when the bulk of individual balance sheets are still
robust or when they have become fragile, determines whether the financial system will
self-adjust or spiral into a crisis. And in an extreme case, such as the 1929-33 Great
Depression, spiraling asset and debt deflation, combined with severe downward wageprice spiraling and rapidly declining aggregate demand, can push the entire economy into
a near death spiral.
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Minsky’s policy propositions derive from this range of possible crisis outcomes.
“Thwarting Mechanisms,” preemptive “policy surprises” by the monetary authorities, are
intended to curb overly optimistic risk/return expectations before they get fully embodied
in dangerous debt and asset bubbles. But thwarting mechanisms lose effectiveness as
market agents learn to innovate around the new constraints, so they require periodic
revision or replacement. From the FIH perspective, neither government policies nor
market processes of capitalist economies can produce stable equilibrium growth paths.
What interventionist policies can do is dampen the volatility of market processes by
timely interventions [Ferri and Minsky 1992]. The thwarting mechanism concept takes
to a higher level the aphorism, popular among conservative central bankers of the postwar Golden Age, that their job is to remove the punchbowl when the party really gets
going. It is thus subject to the riposte then and now from anti-policy-surprise economists
that this assumes government bureaucrats have more accurate information about future
returns than market agents. But the riposte misses the essential point. At issue is not
difference in knowledge but difference in objective function. Market agents are
constrained to pursue individual goals—greater profit and wealth. Central bankers and
other economic bureaucrats are supposed to pursue collective goals, such as more stable
economic growth.
Similarly, the contrast between the Great Depression and the moderateness thus
far of post-WW II business cycles in the industrialized countries motivated Minsky’s
proposition that “Big Government” is an important bulwark against a reprise of a Great
Depression-scale disaster. “Big Government” means the central government’s
expenditures are a large enough share of GDP and its revenue structure sufficiently
progressive to produce automatic stabilizers large enough to dampen significantly the
cyclical fluctuations of aggregate demand. The Great Depression culminated an era of
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“small government” with regressive tax structures. Automatic stabilizers were then
lacking to even partly offset the impact on aggregate demand of the pro-cyclical fiscal
efforts by which governments sought initially to avert the financial spiraling. On the
other hand, war financing, and the post-WW II ideological shifts that produced the
welfare state, progressive taxation and the acceptance of active counter-cyclical policies,
also produced strong automatic stabilizers, while easing the need to precisely time the
active policies.
Minsky developed the FIH in a closed economy context, but it can easily and
fruitfully be extended to open economies and globalized finance. Required, as Arestis
and Glickman show, is adding exchange rate risk to Minsky’s focus on credit risk.
[Arestis and Glickman 1999]. Exchange rate risk alters Minsky’s tri-partite typology of
financing units. Hedge financing units, firms that borrow with the expectation that their
future cash flows will be able to fully pay off principal as well as interest without cutting
into working capital, are the backbone of the financial tranquility phase in Minsky’s
version of the FIH. But if the same debt is borrowed in a different currency from their
revenue they become de facto speculative units, since they risk having to roll over rather
than pay off principal, should the exchange rate depreciate. Speculative units, firms that
debt leverage to where they expect to fully service the interest on the debt but to have to
roll over the principal, drive the expansionary phase of the FIH in its closed economy
version. In that version, An upsurge of rollover interest costs or diminution of cash flow
can convert them into Ponzi units, requiring expanding debt to meet the interest service
as well as to and roll over the principal on existing debt; i.e., they become technically
insolvent. Their numbers are increased by endogenous shocks as the FIH reaches its
crisis phase. In the open economy FIH, speculative units that borrow in a different
currency from their revenue are dubbed “super speculative” by Arestis and Glickman,
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since exchange rate depreciation as well as credit tightening can transform them into
Ponzi units. Moreover, governments who borrow in currencies other than the one they
can print and collect taxes are also “super-speculative” units. In all, its dynamics are
likely to move the FIH to a crisis phase faster in open than closed economies.

V. Inferences of the FIH for Development Policy and for Stabilizing Financial
Globalization
The FIH reverses the causal implications of the frequently cited correlation
between financial deepening and economic development. Broadening and deepening the
economy’s productive capacity pulls financial deepening along, rather than the reverse.
That is, the dynamics of the FIH include Tobin’s Q relation, in which the physical
investment rate gets pulled up as the booming equity markets bid up the capital value of
existing firms above their replacement cost. But in open economies, the degree to which
the equity boom will generate a boom in domestic intermediate and capital goods
industries, and a strong multiplier impact on domestic aggregate demand, depends on the
size, depth, and technological sophistication of the existing industrial structure.
Industrialized economies equipped with such structures now have financial sectors that
have deepened by servicing the long-term financing needs of their deepening industrial
structures, and are able to fund in domestic currency most of the boom in goods
production. By contrast, in developing economies with liberalized and privatized
financial institutions but shallow industrial structures, the equity boom mainly generates a
surging demand for capital and intermediate goods imports, and for the foreign exchange
to fund the purchases. Domestic banks typically supply most of the foreign exchange to
the final purchasers by borrowing abroad to onlend at home, profiting from the interest
spread. The result is a weaker multiplier impact on domestic aggregate demand, and a
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strong association of financial liberalization with frequent “twin” currency and banking
crises that severely depress output and employment and deter financial deepening
[Kaminsky and Reinhart 1996].
Thus, the FIH and the evidence to date refute the neo-liberal claim that building
up the financial sector through financial liberalization is the most effective financial
strategy for promoting the long-term economic growth of developing countries. Rather,
using financial policy to reduce the vulnerability of economic growth to external
blockages by facilitating the broadening and deepening of the productive structure should
take precedence over financial liberalization. Of current neo-liberal modifications of
earlier enthusiasm for financial liberalization, such as liberalizing in step with building up
human capital, learning from past mistakes, and liberalizing the production sector,19 the
first two requirements change little. The buildup of human capital and learning from past
mistakes could as well improve the use of the financial instruments, such as capital
controls, official development banks, and financial subsidies and restrictions, that
industrial strategies rely on to help channel resources to priority areas.
However, the advice to keep liberalizing the financial sector in step with further
liberalizing of the production sector, does indeed differ from reinstituting industrial
strategies and their financial controls as a response to the poor performance and rising
discontent with neo-liberalism as a development strategy. To be sure, since few if any
developing countries have as yet fully liberalized, defenders can blame the poor
performance of neo-liberalism on incomplete implementation rather than basic analytic
flaws. But as the IMF reports cited above admit, the IMF hasn’t a clue as to whether this
means speeding up or slowing down the liberalization process, which empties both the
defense and the gradualism advice of substance.
19

See the advice to Latin America of IMF Deputy Managing Director Eduardo Aninat at Chilean and
Peruvian seminars, IMF Financial Survey March 3, 2003.
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What remains is the belief that the globalized financial markets will also learn
from past misbehavior, and become as time goes on more stable suppliers of international
finance, thus creating a progressively safer global environment to facilitate the efforts of
developing countries to liberalize further. The FIH shares the first part of this belief, but
not the second. Financial innovation and risk reassessment are ongoing processes, but
they need not bring financial stability closer, according to the FIH. Rather they are
essential components of the financial dynamics that, unless checked by countervailing
policies, will continue to move capitalist financial systems recurrently from robustness to
fragility. To illustrate:
In reaction to the 1980s Latin American debt crisis, the Basel Committee of
central bankers from the major industrial countries reached an accord in 1988, now
dubbed Basel 1, intended to reduce risky loan pushing by banks. Basel 1 divided bank
lending into rising credit-risk classes, and set higher compulsory equity capital to loan
ratios for the riskier loan classes. But as the central banks began implementing the
requirements on banks under their jurisdiction, the banks began gaming the new
restrictions.
The gaming has taken four major forms, two merely involving altered lending
strategies and two requiring financial innovating. The altered lending strategies sharply
increased inter-bank loans and short-term lending to developing countries, each of which
were in lower risk classes than were long-term loans, as shares of total assets on the
bank’s balance sheet. Much of the explosion of inter-bank lending was applied to
covered interest rate arbitraging, but part of it financed the expansion of open speculation
on exchange rate movements and interest rate spreads by bank clients and by the banks
themselves. The fast growth of short-term lending to developing countries went mostly
to local banks for domestic onlending. In East Asian countries it financed the
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overleveraging of industrial investment and the real estate bubbles that led to the 1997
financial crises. Not surprisingly, IMF analysts, still bemused then by the EMH+, gave a
green light to these trends in their pre-crisis reports, and when the crises broke, the IMF
conditioned the bailout credits on sharp increases of domestic interest rates to re-attract
the fleeing foreign bank lenders. The interest increases instead produced waves of
domestic bankruptcies that overwhelmed the local banks with bad loans, setting off
massive credit crunches that intensified the decline of output and employment That also
intensified rioting in the streets, forcing the IMF to countermand its austerity orders and
acquiesce instead to expansionary monetary-fiscal measures to turn things around.
Today, the IMF warns developing countries against loading up heavily with short-term
foreign debt, and approves the deposit requirements that Chile has used to control hot
money inflows. But controls on capital outflows are still off its formulary.
The two major bank innovations, securitization and customized derivative
mongering, were intended to profit from off-balance sheet lending activities that were
exempt from equity capital requirements. Securitization meant booking long-term loans
that could be quickly converted and resold as bonds collateralized by the stream of
interest payments and/or other cash flow commitments of the original loans, with the
banks setting the initial bond price to yield them a moderate one-time profit. Derivative
mongering meant devising and selling “over the counter” (OTC) customized interest,
commodity and exchange rate derivatives for a fee to corporations and hedge funds
seeking cheaper ways to hedge against various perceived risks from their operations. To
generate high returns on equity, both innovations require large volume and rapid turnover
of bank funds. Hence the large international banks that dominated the innovations had by
the late 1990s pushed the value of the global stock of securitized bonds to multi-trillion
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dollars, while the notional value of the global stock of OTC derivatives reached a
staggering $99.7 trillion in June 2001 [BIS 2001; p. 23].
The ballooning of global financial transactions relative to the growth of
production and trade of non-financial products also increased the volume and variety of
financial risks. Basel 1 had concerned itself merely with credit risk. But the wholesale
conversion of long-term bank loans into securitized bonds, which enabled the initiating
banks to pass on the credit risk to the bond holders, also inflicted market risk on the
holders--the risk that falling bond prices due to an increase in interest rates or in default
risk might substantially depreciate the value of their assets.20 The huge volume of OTC
derivative transactions and of inter-bank lending augment settlement risk--the risk to
participating banks that their transaction counterparties might renege on payment
commitments. The systemic repercussions of settlement risk are further augmented
because OTC derivative mongering and inter-bank lending are concentrated globally in a
few dozen very large banks who typically engage in very sizeable transactions.
In reaction to the gaming of Basel 1 and the accumulation of financial risks with
systemic repercussions, the Basel Committee decided in the mid-1990s to devise an
updated risk control accord, dubbed Basel 2. The effort has focused on supplementing
pre-defined risk classes, with market risk assessments by bond rating agencies such as
Moody and Standard and Poor, and in-house risk control systems of the large banks.
Reaching agreement on details, has, however, been a prolonged process. Basel 2 is now
supposed to be finalized this year (2003), and to go into full operation in 2007. Can it
stabilize the globalized financial markets? An insightful analysis by two Deutsche Bank
20

This is being brought home big time by the recent collapse of the IT and telecommunication bubbles,
which has wiped out an estimated $3 trillion of bond market values, much of it securitized bonds. The main
holders affected have been U.S. and European pension funds and insurance companies, leaving many of
them underfunded relative to their expected payout commitments. Higher insurance rates and risk of
breaks in payouts are part of the asset and debt deflation process currently depressing private profits and
investment in the U.S. and the EU.
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economists [Folkerts-Landau and Garber 1998] concludes with a resounding no. The
effect of adding the additional risk control methods might well be to increase global
volatility and contagion. To quote the authors:
“A downgrade of a country’s credit rating leads to an immediate sell-off of its
bonds and an inability to approach the market for more funding. Risk control systems
require that margin calls in foreign exchange be made on domestic counterparties whose
derivative positions…take losses from market price movements. A volatility event in one
country automatically will generate an upward re-estimate of credit and market risk in a
correlated country, triggering automatic margin calls and tightening of credit
lines….These are not the responses of panicked green-screen traders arbitrarily driving
economies from a good to a bad equilibrium. Rather they work with relentless
predictability and under the seal of approval of supervisors in the main financial centers.
‘Contagion’ is the other side of the coin of risk control in the industrial countries.”
A case for reintroducing capital controls? Not for the authors. To quote again
from their analysis:
“Modern risk control methods pushed heavily by the BIS and national regulatory
authorities are liquidity hungry. They trigger heavy demands for cash, collateral, and
capital on a systemic level when asset prices move significantly. Such methods have
now created a clear tension between the thrust of prudential regulation of industrial
country supervisors and the lender of last resort responsibility of G-7 authorities.”
“Credit and currency control events are poison for such systems of risk
management. These break the netting and hedging vision under which most traders and
risk managers work. If funds cannot be moved across borders easily or if a piece of a
portfolio defaults, then risk control methods fall apart. Positions must be regarded from a
gross not a net basis, with considerably higher capital costs than may be justified by the
risk-return tradeoff of a given security.”
In sum, the analysis depicts the international financial markets as implacably
unstable, but beyond public control. Can anything be done? In 1999 Congressional
testimony, Folkerts-Landau, former high-level IMF apparatchik and now Managing
Director and Global Head of Research of the Deutsche Bank, gave his harsh policy
advice.21 Do not try to change the behavior of the international financial markets, but
strengthen instead the power of the IMF to force developing countries to accept the
disciplining of the financial markets.
21

Hearings on the Architecture of International Finance of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee
on Banking and Financial Services, May 20, 1999.
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“More concretely, after improving its surveillance capability the Fund will need to
go public with its findings and let the markets do the rest. It will need to pressure
countries publicly for policy changes, including international sanctions, aid curtailment,
the imposition of additional capital requirements on bank lending to countries identified
as following destabilizing policies, and ultimately declaring countries ineligible for
access to the Fund’s lending facilities—it is astonishing that this has never happened.”
The analysis passes over the likelihood that banks will adapt their risk controls to
changes in the global regulatory environment. And Folkerts-Landau’s testimony merely
demonstrated his own lousy surveillance capability, when he illustrated his case by
lauding Argentina as one of the few developing countries with “the necessary economic
policy discipline” for sustainimg “access to large inflows of foreign capital.”
However, the basic message of his analysis, that strengthening prudential
supervision of the financial center banks will not stabilize financial globalization is valid,
even if his policy conclusion is neither adequate nor moral. It is inadequate because the
vast bulk of global financial transacting is between the industrial countries. Forcing
developing countries to absorb the instability of their small share of global transacting
touches merely the fringes of the global instability problem. It is immoral because it
imposes the entire adjustment burden of that unstable share on the weaker and poorer
partner. The current worries that a replay of the Great Depression could be in the offing
emphasize discordant fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies among the U.S., the
E.U. and Japan, as well as the ease with which the liberated and excessively liquid global
financial markets react to thwart efforts at policy adjustment. Both features have a late
1920s aura. The renewed interest in capital control mechanisms thus arises from
recognition that they are a prerequisite for effecting improved policy coordination
between the Big Three as well as for allowing developing countries to pursue countercyclical stabilization and industrial development strategies.
The IMF in its current lending has been backing away from the policy direction
advocated by Folkerts-Landau. The terms of the new rollover of its Argentine loans,
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which largely acquiesce to the Argentine government’s demand that it be allowed to
finance economic recovery before renewing its dollar debt payments, has upset the
international financial markets, not least because it may presage a general weakening of
the IMF’s role of debt payment enforcer. Yet capital controls, even “market-friendly”
ones like the Tobin tax , not only remain off the IMF’s policy agenda, but remain too hot
a topic for honest public appraisal by its analysts. The latter is evidenced by a recent
piece by Kenneth Rogoff, the IMF’s outgoing Economic Counsellor and Director of
Research. (“Rethinking Capital Controls,” Finance & Development, December, 2002).
In a single paragraph, Rogoff, who surely knows better, dismisses the Tobin tax concept
by falsely accusing Tobin of having been motivated by the belief that “all short-term
flows are bad,” and by falsely claiming that the tax “would discriminate indiscriminately
against all short-term flows,” including trade credits, “the life blood of all trade.” The
latter assertion is precisely the opposite of the objective of the tax and of its practical
effect, since its proposed small globally uniform tax on all exchange transactions would
impose a smaller relative tax burden on transactions involving longer round trips, like
trade credits, than on the short-term round tripping characteristic of arbitrage and
speculative exchange transactions.22
This suggests a two-pronged approach to render alternative development
strategies to neo-liberalism more feasible. Give capital controls a prominent place in the
development programming, as a pre-requisite for implementing counter-cyclical
macroeconomic policies as well as counter-free market industrialization programs. But
concurrently, urge developing country governments to demand that serious consideration
22

Earlier published IMF critiques of the Tobin tax were misguided, but not deceitful. The gist of those
critiques was that if the international financial system was always in full equilibrium, the Tobin tax would
necessarily be introducing a welfare-reducing “distortion.” If one believed in the EMH+, as apparently
many IMF economists did back then, the analysis was at least intellectually honest, if worthless. Rogoff’s
dismissal, on the other hand, merely reflects an arrogant disregard of the voluminous published literature on
the tax and its feasibility.
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be given to proposals for thwarting measures by the major industrial country blocs to
stabilize financial globalization and for macro-policy coordination to stabilize global
aggregate demand. Were that to strengthen the political clout of such proposals
sufficiently to allow collective rationality to triumph over the current ideological and
narrow self-interest barriers blocking adoption, it would be short-cut return to the humane
global vision of the early Bretton Woods era. Were it to fall short, the first prong would
still leave developing countries better equipped to ride out a reprise of the stormy 1930s
that led to Bretton Woods.
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